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Non-technical summary 
Germany has a more compressed wage structure than most industrialized countries 
and many commentators see wage compression as an important source of high 
unemployment. One possibility is that this compression is partly the result of the 
country’s unique system of workplace codetermination. But although German’s 
works councils have far reaching powers, their impact on the anatomy of wages 
has not been examined heretofore. The reasons for this neglect include historically 
inadequate data – we need linked employer employee data to calculate not only 
the average wage level per establishment but also the variance in wages – and 
perhaps even the supposition that the role of works councils must be marginal 
since the enabling legislation (the Works Constitution Act) seemingly suppresses 
any independent wage bargaining role unless the entity is given express 
permission under the relevant sectoral wage agreement. 
The present paper therefore looks at the impact of the works council on the 
structure of wages in Germany using the 2001 wave of the nationally 
representative linked employer employee data set of the Institute for Labour 
Market Research in Nuremberg (LIAB). It deploys augmented Mincerian wage 
equations and also takes into account the possible endogeneity of works councils 
as well as unobserved establishment and employee heterogeneity – in the former 
case by adding a propensity score for the likelihood of observing a works council, 
and in the latter case by including average employee characteristics.  
It is shown that works councils elevate wages. Moreover, the works council 
premium exceeds any collective bargaining markup, at either sectoral or 
establishment level. Quantile regressions further reveal that the wage effect tends 
to be greatest lower down in the earnings distribution. In other words, works 
councils reduce the standard deviation of wages and the coefficient of variation of 
wages in a manner comparable to collective bargaining proper. In contrast to the 
literature on collective bargaining, however, women are shown to benefit more 
from the presence of works councils than do men. Accordingly, works councils 
attenuate the gender wage gap.  
 Finally, the paper also investigates whether the longer tenure of employees 
in works councils establishments reflects higher wages, signalling rent extraction, 
or compensating differentials. Once predicted wages from an equation describing 
wages of employees in establishments without works councils are interacted with 
the works council dummy, it is found that only a small part of the higher wages 
seem to indicate rent seeking. This finding receives support from a separate 
analysis that compares the direct effect of wages and works councils on tenure. 
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ABSTRACT 
This paper provides the first full examination of the effect of German works 
councils on wages using matched employer-employee data (specifically, the LIAB 
for 2001). We find that works councils are associated with higher earnings.  The 
wage premium is around 11 percent (and is higher under collective bargaining). 
This result persists after taking account of worker and establishment heterogeneity 
and the endogeneity of works council presence. Next, using quantile regressions, 
we find that the works council premium is decreasing with the position of the 
worker in the wage distribution. And it is also higher for women than for men. 
Finally, the works council wage premium is associated with longer job tenure. 
This suggests that some of the premium is a noncompetitive rent, even if works 
council voice may dominate its distributive effects insofar as tenure is concerned.  
 
 
JEL Classification: J31, J50. 
Keywords: matched employer-employee data, rent seeking, tenure, wages, wage 
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I.  Introduction 
The effects of works councils on most aspects of firm performance – profitability, 
labor productivity, employment growth, and more recently investment in tangible 
capital – have been investigated for a number of years now (for a survey, see 
Addison et al., 2004b). Altogether less well investigated have been their effects on 
wages. This is at first blush curious because analysts reporting adverse effects on 
other outcomes have tended to rely on rent-seeking behavior, and not just 
bureaucratization, by way of explanation for their findings. On closer inspection, 
however, the source of the comparative neglect of wage determination is clear: 
data limitations. Typically, plant-level data sets only contain information on 
average wages, derived from data on the total wage bill and employment. A proper 
ceteris paribus earnings analysis requires the estimation of an augmented 
Mincerian function on the basis of individual data, without which direct 
investigation of rent seeking is hamstrung. Arguably some research may also have 
been deflected by the very terms of the German legislation – the Works 
Constitution Act – that foreclose wage bargaining by the works council unless this 
is expressly provided for under the relevant sectoral wage agreement.  
With the recent availability of linked employer-employee datasets we can 
do much more. Not only can we look at works council effects on wages holding 
constant human capital, demographic, and other individual (and plant) 
characteristics, we can also inspect the entire wage distribution. This focus is 
appropriate because it might be hypothesized that works councils seek equal pay 
and reduced earnings dispersion. This propensity may be an insurance strategy and 
reflect the preferences of risk-averse employees (Horn and Svensson, 1986). 
Further, an earnings function approach in conjunction with information on tenure 
also permits the analyst to address explanations other than rent seeking for wage 
premia attaching to plants with works councils. 
In the present paper, we will deploy one such data set, the nationally 
representative linked employer-employee data set of the IAB (LIAB), which 
combines the employment register statistics of the German Federal Employment 
Agency (Bundesagentur für Arbeit) with plant-level data from the Institute for 
Employment Research (Institut für Arbeitsmarkt- und Berufsforschung, or IAB) 
Establishment Panel. The LIAB is described in section IV and is prefaced in 
section III by a statement of our empirical model, which draws on Card and de la 
Rica (2006) insightful treatment. Section V then contains our detailed findings 
organized along the dimensions of wages, the wage structure, and job tenure. All 
of this is preceded, however, by a consideration of the institutional setting, 
including a review of the sparse existing literature on works councils and wages. 
 
II. The Institutional Setting 
Works Councils, Collective Bargaining and the Dual System 
Collective bargaining in Germany is formally based on trade unions and 
employers’ associations. With the exception of some firms that conclude their own 
agreements with unions, collective bargaining over wages and conditions (job 
classifications, working time, and working conditions) is conducted outside the 
plant. Decisions on strikes and lockouts are similarly detached from the local 
level. Works councils, on the other hand, focus on production issues, handle 
individual grievances, and are charged with the implementation of collective 
agreements at the plant level. They may only negotiate plant agreements with local 
management on matters that are not covered, or not usually covered, by collective 
agreements, unless a collective agreement expressly authorizes otherwise (section 
77(3) of the Works Constitution Act). That said, they have always been involved 
in wage setting for two main reasons. First, their extensive codetermination rights 
(noted below) convey power that can be exercised sotto voce. Secondly, wage drift 
has long characterized wage determination in German manufacturing. One-size-
fits-all collective agreements necessarily do not allow for individual needs 
(historically, those of the high fliers) and they have been accompanied by the 
lubricant of wage drift. Works councils have actively participated in the fixing of 
wages above Tarif levels (i.e. the formal wage schedules set under collective 
bargaining) and the provision of special bonuses and allowances. Nevertheless, 
collective bargaining agreements have always been accorded a higher status than 
workplace agreements. 
The functions of works councils are fixed under law. According to the 
Works Constitution Act, works councils may be set up in all establishments with 
at least five permanent employees following a petition by a small group of 
workers or by a trade union represented at the establishment. While mandated, 
then, works councils are not automatic. Works councilors are elected in secret 
ballot for a 4-year term, and they represent all workers not just union members. 
Although works councils are formally independent of unions, as a practical matter 
ties between the two agencies are close, three out of five works councilors being 
union members. Traditionally, they have assisted in union recruitment at the place 
of work. Because of this function they have been referred to as “pillars of union 
security” (Müller-Jentsch, 1995, p. 610). 
 The law provides the works council with far-reaching rights of information 
and consultation – in areas such as manpower planning, and changes in work 
processes, the working environment, and job content – together with an explicit set 
of codetermination or joint-management rights on so-called ‘social matters.’ The 
latter include the commencement and termination of working hours, principles of 
remuneration, pay arrangements including the fixing of job and bonus rates, the 
regulation of overtime and reduced working hours, holiday arrangements, and 
health and safety matters. The works council also enjoys ‘consent rights’ in 
matters of hiring and firing as well as job classification (the placement of workers 
in certain wage groups). Further, works council authority – as indexed by formal 
competence and size (including the number of full-time councilors) – is increasing 
in establishment size. 
Over time the competence or authority of the works council has increased. 
The first Works Constitution Act in 1952, which still forms much of the basis of 
the information, consultation, and codetermination right of the works council, 
emphasized the independence of the works council and recognized only limited 
rights for unions in the plant. Works councils were also prohibited from striking, 
as indeed they still are. The second Works Constitution Act in 1972 materially 
extended the information and consultation rights of the works council in respect of 
management decisions involving changes in capacity, working operations, and 
production processes, as well as strengthening codetermination rights by allowing 
for adjudication in the event of an impasse. It also improved the access of unions 
to the workplace and permitted them to submit lists of candidates in works council 
elections, as well as allowing works councilors to hold union office. The most 
recent legislation – the 2001 Works Constitution Reform Act – sought to stimulate 
works council formation, to strengthen existing works councils (e.g. by increasing 
the number of full-time works councilors), and to improve the operation of the 
works council apparatus. In the latter exercise, cost was said to be secondary to 
democracy at the workplace (for details, see Addison et al., 2004a). At the same 
time, acceptance by management of the entity seems to have grown. The reason is 
that, while typically cut from the union cloth, works councilors are often more 
pragmatic and flexible than unions. 
 
Works Councils and Wages 
As noted earlier, there is comparatively little information on the effect of works 
councils on wages. The literature on the impact of collective bargaining proper on 
wages is also sparse (see below). As far as works council impact is concerned, the 
early literature comes to different conclusions. Thus, in their analysis of 60 firms 
in the metal working industry, using pooled data for 1977 and 1979, FitzRoy and 
Kraft (1985) fail to detect any positive effect of works councils on wages.1 Rather, 
the authors attribute the adverse effect of works councils on their performance 
measure – specifically, firm profitability – to slower decision making rather than 
to rent seeking.  By contrast, in an analysis of 50 industrial firms in 1990/91, 
Addison et al. (1993) obtain a significantly positive coefficient estimate for a 
works council dummy variable in their OLS and LMS/RLS wage regressions (see 
also Meyer, 1995a). 
More recent studies using larger datasets also present a mixed picture. In an 
analysis of the first wave of the Hannoveraner Firmenpanel, covering 
manufacturing establishments in Lower Saxony, Addison et al. (2001) report in 
OLS wage regressions that wages are approximately 15 to 18.5 percent higher in 
works council regimes. The authors also investigate the gap between the wage 
fixed at industry/regional level and that paid at the establishment, using 
management-reported estimates of the percentage wage gap (übertarifliche 
Entlohnung).2 The authors’ Tobit estimates fail to indicate any influence of works 
councils on the wage gap for either blue-collar or white-collar employees. 
However, in exploiting a question in the panel inquiring of managers whether or 
not the works council was jointly involved in determining the wage gap, Addison 
et al. (1997) report that the gap is higher where the works council is involved in 
wage determination.3  
The most recent study to investigate works council wage effects also uses 
(two waves of) the Hannoveraner Firmenpanel.  Hübler and Jirjahn (2003) offer a 
test of the Freeman-Lazear (1995) model that, where a council coexists/is 
embedded in a collective bargaining agreement, councils and local management 
are likely to maximize the joint surplus. In contrast, where there is no collective 
agreement (external to the firm) there is said to be little to constrain rent-seeking 
councils.4 Interestingly, Hübler and Jirjahn report no evidence of an effect of 
collective bargaining on wages, which they justify on the grounds that the 
outcome of collective agreements is usually extended to the overwhelming number 
of employees in an industry (but see Addison et al., 2006, for a discussion of the 
erosion of collective bargaining coverage).5 For their part, works councils are 
found to have a positive effect on wages, which outcome is more evident for the 
uncovered sample. They are also associated with a well-defined positive effect on 
productivity in the covered sector. 
Yet more recent studies have examined the link between collective 
bargaining proper and wages, but without controlling for works council presence. 
Using the same dataset as that employed in the present paper, albeit for 1996 
rather than 2001, Kölling et al. (2005) find that, contrary to the previous study, 
collective bargaining at sectoral level raises wages, at least for the least-skilled 
workers. Another study by Stephan and Gerlach (2005), again using linked 
employer-employee data – but this time for Lower Saxony – for the years 1990, 
1995, and 2001 reports evidence of a rising wage premium over time for the 
average covered worker. Specifically, the wage gain for working under an 
industry-level collective bargaining agreement increased from 4 percent in 1991, 
through 9 percent in 1995, to 12 percent in 2001. 
As we see it, the suggestions derived from the empirical literature are as 
follows. First, and most important, works councils may indeed influence wages, 
despite section 77 (3) of the Constitution Act. But the manner of that influence can 
be subtle; in particular, the effect may vary along the skills continuum and the 
wage distribution. Further, in circumstances where that effect hinges on 
management being willing or choosing to discuss supplementary payments, the 
premium may reflect the payment of efficiency wages. Second, collective 
bargaining proper may be expected to influence wages in Germany no less than in 
other nations.  
 
III. Methodology 
Earnings regressions  
Our starting point is the standard Mincerian earnings function in which individual 
(log) wages, yi, are a function of (observed) productive characteristics, X1i, to 
include both general and specific skills (proxied by schooling, tenure, and 
occupation), and control variables specific to establishments, Zj. In particular, we 
are interested in the specific role of the works council institution, Fj.  We thus 
specify the model 
ijjii eFBZBXy +++= δ11 .                          (1) 
It is natural to assume that this model suffers from heterogeneity bias (or 
omitted variable bias), in the sense that not all relevant individual (productive) 
characteristics are observed (or collected by the researcher). If unobserved 
heterogeneity is assumed to be correlated with the observed characteristics, then it 
is straightforward to show that the (OLS) coefficients estimates of model (1) will 
be biased.6 One way to control for heterogeneity bias is to assume that workers in 
the same workplace share some common (unobserved) characteristics. Adding 
establishment-average characteristics X2j to equation (1) may enable us to control 
for a key source of contamination. Accordingly, we have 
              ijjjii uFBZBXBXy ++++= δ2211 ,                                             
(2) where, X1i, X2j, and Zj denote the characteristics of workers, co-workers in the 
same establishment, and establishments, respectively, and Fj again denotes the 
works council status of the establishment.  
Finally, to control for the possibility of an establishment self-selecting into 
works council status, we add to the model the predicted propensity score – that is, 
the estimated probability (or the normal hazard function) of a given establishment 
having a works council, jpˆ , giving 
ijjjjii pFBZBXBXy ελδ +++++= ˆ2211 .      (3) 
This model will be estimated for all workers and for men and women separately, 
using both OLS and quantile regression methods. This allows us to inquire into the 
anatomy of the works council wage mark-up for different groups of employees. 
 
Job Tenure 
As hypothesized earlier, the payment of higher wages in works council 
establishments may reflect either the ability of works councils to extract a bigger 
portion of the pie (surplus) or the ability of firms to extract a higher worker effort 
from workers by paying efficiency wages. In the former case, workers are paid 
above ‘normal’ wages, and we should observe, everything else constant, higher 
tenure, Ti. In the latter case, establishments pay a compensating differential and no 
correlation between tenure and works council status should be expected. To test 
these conflicting hypotheses, we specify the following model 
ijjjii eFBZBXBXT ++++= δ2211 .                                 (4)              
Once again the parameter estimates – in particular, the coefficient δ  – may 
be biased. In order to capture the true impact of works councils on tenure, 
therefore, we will adopt the strategy followed by Card and de la Rica (2006). 
Specifically, in a first step, we look at the wage profile of workers by estimating 
model (2) for the sample of workers in non-works council establishments. We next 
interact the predicted (log) wage, iyˆ , with the works council variable Fj, giving  
1 1 2 2 ˆ *i i j j j i j iT X B X B Z B F y F eδ γ= + + + + + .                                 (5)    
The parameter γ  will then give the impact of works councils on tenure after 
controlling for the average (non-works council) effect of wages on tenure.  
 
IV. Data 
Our data are taken from the 2001 wave of the LIAB. As noted above, the LIAB 
combines Federal Employment Agency employment statistics with plant-level 
data from the IAB Establishment Panel. The distinctive feature of the LIAB is the 
combination of information on individuals and details concerning the 
establishments that employ them.  
The employment statistics are drawn from the German employment 
register, which contains information on more than 98 percent of the employees 
and trainees included in the establishment panel (Alda, 2005). The employment 
register was established in 1973 to integrate the notification procedures for social 
security (pensions, health insurance, and unemployment insurance). Information is 
recorded at the start and end of the individual’s employment within a firm and in 
annual end-year reports. The employment statistics contain data on the 
individual’s three-digit occupation, daily gross wage in € up to the earnings ceiling 
for social security contributions, gender, year of birth, nationality, marital status, 
number of children, and schooling/training. Each individual record also contains 
the establishment identifier, as well as the size and industry affiliation of that 
establishment. 
 To take account of the top coding of earnings found for roughly 11 percent 
of the sample, we imputed wages for those employees at the censored level. To 
this end, we first created 20 cells differentiated by gender, education (the six 
schooling groups identified in Appendix Table 1) and nationality (German versus 
non-German), and ran censored wage regressions for each. The covariates 
comprised tenure, tenure squared, and three dummies for employee skills. (Our 
procedure recognizes that the level at which wages are top coded differs between 
eastern and western Germany.) Predicted wages for each censored observation 
were then calculated and imputed for each individual. 
For the purposes of the present inquiry it was also necessary to have data on 
length of tenure. However, and similar to the information on wages, the tenure 
data are also censored. In the case of western Germany some 9 percent of 
employees have their tenure censored (at 25 years of tenure), while for eastern 
Germany 35 percent of the sample have censored tenure data (at 10 years of 
tenure). Since most of the censored individuals are employed in works council 
establishments, dropping them may be expected to materially bias the results. For 
this reason, we decided to impute tenure using the same procedure as described 
above for wages. 
 The plant-level component of the LIAB, the IAB Establishment Panel, was 
initiated in 1993 (Kölling, 2000). It is based on a stratified random sample – strata 
for 16 industries and 10 employment size classes – from the population of all 
establishments. Although larger plants are over-sampled, within each cell the 
sampling is random. In 2001 the sample comprised 14,878 plants and some 2.5 
million employees.  
The IAB Establishment Panel was created to meet the needs of the Federal 
Employment Agency for improved information on the demand side of the labor 
market. Accordingly, information on the workforce and its decomposition and 
development through time are central elements of the Panel questionnaire. Further 
questions concern the establishment’s sales, exports, investment expenditures, age, 
and corporate form/legal status. Yet others include the size of the overall wage 
bill, training provision, hours worked, technical status of equipment, overtime 
payments, and collective bargaining status. Most such questions are asked 
annually. 
In summary, the LIAB is created by linking the employment statistics of 
the Federal Employment Agency with the IAB Establishment Panel via the plant 
identifier available in both data sets. The information on length of tenure, in 
particular, first became available in the 2001 wave. This is an important reason to 
use this wave of the LIAB. Moreover, since some key establishment variables 
pertaining to 2001 are only available in the 2002 IAB Establishment Panel, we 
merged this information with the 2002 wave. Our selected establishments are thus 
required to be in both waves. Sectoral coverage includes manufacturing and 
services, and excludes not-for-profit organizations. In addition, only full-time 
individuals aged between 19 and 65 years are included in the sample (apprentices 
were excised). Finally, in order to include only establishments where in principle 
works councils can be present, we dropped all workers in establishments with less 
than five employees. Matching the selected employees to the selected 
establishments resulted in an estimation/regression sample of 1,344,656 workers 
across 8,579 establishments. 
In order to investigate the robustness of our results, we also ran the same 
estimations for establishments with 21 to 100 employees. There are two reasons to 
choose plants within this size interval: in the first place, the powers of their 
councils are to all intents and purposes fixed (otherwise, they are increasing in 
establishment size); and, in the second place, only a tiny minority of smaller plants 
with less than 21 employees have works councils while the large preponderance of 
establishments with more than 100 employees have them (Addison and Teixeira, 
2006). For our sample of establishments with 21 to 100 employees, roughly 38 
percent of establishments and 45 percent of employees are covered by works 
councils. Finally, we also test whether the wage effect of works councils depends 
on the collective bargaining regime and if it differs between selected groups of 
employees. Accordingly, we add interaction terms between these variables and the 
works council dummy. 
 
V. Findings 
Summary data on worker (mean) characteristics for the entire sample and by 
gender and works council status are given in Table 1a. Clearly, workers in works 
council establishments have higher wages than their non-works council 
counterparts (with log daily wages of 4.59 and 4.13, respectively) and men also 
earn more than women (log wages of 4.61 and 4.37, respectively). There is also 
evidence that white-collar workers are more prevalent in works council 
establishments, while low skilled blue-collar workers are in greater preponderance 
in non-works council workplaces by 11 percentage point margin.7 Overall, the 
proportion of workers in the two lowest skill categories, if not educational 
categories, is also higher in establishments where no works council is present. Not 
surprisingly perhaps, collective bargaining coverage is almost universal (94 
percent) for workers in works council establishments but much lower in the case 
of plants without councils (42 percent). Differences in collective agreement 
coverage by gender are minimal, and the same is true of the gender differences in 
schooling. Some 90 percent of all workers are in establishments with works 
councils. 
(Tables 1a and 1b near here) 
 Corresponding establishment means are presented in Table 1b. As it is 
apparent, there are fewer works council establishments than non-works council 
establishments – the latter outnumber the former by a twelve percentage point 
margin. The disparity with respect to Table 1a is due to the fact that bigger 
establishments (namely those with 250 or more workers) have almost complete 
works council coverage. Wages are 37 percent higher in works council 
establishments, and tenure is 2.7 years longer. Collective bargaining coverage is 
also much higher in works council establishments. Finally, establishment-level 
data point to lower tenure on average among women than men, while overtime 
supplements are also much more frequent among men. These two aspects may be 
expected to contribute to the observed wage gender gap of a little over 20 percent 
in favor of men, observed at both individual and establishment level. 
(Tables 2a and 2b near here) 
Table 2a presents the OLS wage regressions with different sets of 
regressors according to equations (1) through (3).  The first column of the table 
confirms the 0.46 (log) wage differential in favor of works councils earlier 
reported in Table 1a. This premium falls dramatically (by around three-quarters) 
once establishment and individual employee characteristics are added to the 
specification. This means that a large share of the wage gap can be explained by 
systematic sorting of firms and employees. Specifically, after adding worker 
characteristics the works council wage differential is around 13.2 percent (column 
2) and this falls to 11.1 percent (column 3) with the further addition of plant 
characteristics and the proxies for differences between workers (the average co-
worker variables). The covariates have the expected signs (see Gürtzgen, 2005; 
Card and de la Rica, 2006). That is, wages increase with age, tenure, 
qualifications, and professional status. They are lower for women and foreigners. 
Further, wages are higher in larger establishments, in establishments applying 
collective wage agreements, as well as in establishments earning high profits and 
paying overtime supplements. 
There is little indication that self-selection by establishments into works 
council status accounts for much of this (reduced) wage premium. The propensity 
score coefficient is statistically significant but, comparing columns (3) and (4), it 
can be seen that there is only a trivial increase in the differential – from 11.1 to 
11.4 percent – with the addition of this argument. The propensity that a works 
councils is present is calculated using the standard covariates (see Addison et al., 
1997): establishment size and establishment size squared, the share of blue-collar, 
temporary workers, female, and part-time employees, establishment age (dummy), 
collective bargaining (at establishment and sector level), payment above levels set 
under collective bargaining, the profit situation (dummy), location (in eastern 
versus western Germany), and 16 sector dummies – the Probit regression, not 
reported here but available from the authors on request, is well defined with a 
pseudo-R2 of 0.37, and all covariates (other than payment above the collective 
bargaining level) are statistically significant at conventional levels and of the 
expected sign. 
The premium associated with collective bargaining coverage (at either 
sectoral or establishment level) is around 6 percent. This is one-half that reported 
by Stephan and Gerlach (2005, p. 2301) in their study of Lower Saxony, but taken 
together the two sets of findings using matched employer-employee data help 
dispel the illusion that extension of coverage implies the absence of a union 
premium. 
Turning to the separate results by gender in Table 2b, we obtain the 
interesting ceteris paribus result that the presence of a works council benefits 
female workers in particular. Since women have lower wages on average, this 
finding implies that the institution attenuates the gender differential in Germany. 
This attenuation is also reported by Gartner and Stephan (2004), using the 
decomposition suggested by Juhn et al. (1993). As shown in Appendix Table 2, we 
obtain the same result if we pool the two sub-samples (of men and women 
workers) and interact the works council argument with a female dummy variable. 
It is estimated in this case that the wage gender gap in works council 
establishments decreases by 9.8 percent. 
(Table 3 near here) 
The presence of a gender gap is also confirmed in Table 3 for all schooling 
levels. From the second row of the table it can be seen that females earn between 
12.3 and 18.5 percent less than do males. For its part, the wage premium 
associated with works council presence is broadly though not monotonically 
decreasing in the skill (or schooling) level, namely, from around 11 percent for the 
least skilled (secondary education without a professional qualification) to 8.7 
percent for workers with a university degree. So there is some indication that 
works councils play a role in wage compression, narrowing to some degree the 
wage gap between high- and low-schooling individuals and the gender wage gap. 
We note, however, that this picture is less evident when we interact the works 
council dummy with the education dummies (see Appendix Table 2).  
(Table 4 near here) 
Table 4 gives some results from fitting quantile regressions to our earnings 
data for all workers and separately by gender. The table provides results for the 
0.2, 0.4, 0.6, and 0.8 quantiles. We see that the wage premium for being covered 
by a works council is significantly declining in earnings for the entire sample and 
also for men and for women.8 For females, the premium for the 0.2 quantile is 
almost 20 percent as compared with only 12 percent at the 0.8 quantile. The 
differences for men are more muted at 11.0 and 6.7 percent, respectively. These 
results show again that works councils have a an impact on wage compression in 
Germany. 
The wage impact of works councils might be dependent on the collective 
bargaining regime. We therefore also interacted the works council dummy with 
our two collective bargaining variables (at sector and firm level). The results are 
reported in Appendix Table 2. From the second column of the table we find 
confirmation of Hübler and Jirjahn’s (2003) result that works councils do have an 
independent impact on wages in the order of 10.6 percent – but observe that the 
works council effect differs by type of collective agreement. For establishments 
covered by sectoral collective bargaining the works council effect is roughly 10 
percent (=0.106-0.008), whereas for firm level bargaining the corresponding 
premium is some 22 percent (0.106 +0.113). This might be an indication that 
works councils indeed use their bargaining power if there is some leeway in 
establishment-level wage bargaining. As a practical matter, however, given that 
there is a works council we observe minor differences between wages in the two 
collective bargaining regimes. 
The impact of works councils on the wage structure can also be examined 
using wage dispersion information aggregated at the establishment level. To this 
end, we computed two straightforward measures of wage dispersion within 
establishments: the standard deviation of individual wages and the coefficient of 
variation. Appendix Table 3 presents the results of this exercise. The bottom line 
is that there is again evidence of works councils reducing wage dispersion 
(irrespective of the collective bargaining regime). However, the reductions in the 
standard deviation and the coefficient of variation of wages in works council 
establishments are only just around -0.8 and -0.02, respectively. 
Finally, we tackle the important issue of whether higher tenure is a 
consequence of rent-seeking or efficiency wages. We estimate the tenure model 
given by equations (4) and (5). The results are reported in Table 5. If works 
councils imply higher wages, ceteris paribus workers in establishments with 
works councils will tend to have greater tenure. The results in the first column of 
the table confirm this: the coefficient estimate for the works council term is 
positive and statistically significant, indicating that workers in establishments with 
works councils do indeed have higher job tenure. On average, workers covered by 
works councils have 1.6 years of additional tenure. Observe that since the 
estimated model contains one dummy for each year of age, we are strictly 
comparing individuals of the same age. The works council effect on tenure of male 
and female workers is virtually the same. 
(Table 5 near here) 
The tenure regression in the first column of Table 5 does not include a 
direct control for wages. A strong and enduring finding in the literature is that the 
higher are earnings, the lower is turnover and thence (abstracting from the issue of 
the effect of tenure on earnings) the higher is tenure (Farber, 1994). In order to 
isolate the effect of works councils on tenure and address directly the wage impact 
on tenure, we follow the approach by Card and de la Rica (2006). We first identify 
the wage profile in other than works council establishments and then interact the 
predicted wages obtained from this regression with the works council dummy. The 
logic behind this approach is that if the wage premium is a compensating 
differential – or a return to unmeasured quality differences between workers – it 
should not necessarily influence job tenure. The results of this exercise are 
reported in the second column of Table 5. For the entire sample, the coefficient 
estimate for the interaction term is positive and statistically significant, indicating 
that the tenure gap is increasing in (expected) wages. The size of this effect is 
nevertheless rather small: wages have almost to double to generate an additional 
year of tenure. This result suggests that while works councils increase wages (and 
tenure) of all workers, the major implication seems to be a more compressed wage 
structure, which is then translated into a relatively small tenure gap over the 
distribution of wages/skills. As is readily apparent from the results in the last two 
columns of Table 5, the results carry over to male and female workers. Note that, 
for female workers, the coefficient estimate for the interaction term between 
predicted wages and works councils is clearly smaller than for males and fails to 
achieve statistical significance. 
At this stage it is also worthwhile to attempt to disentangle the relative 
importance of wages versus works council regime on the tenure profiles of 
individuals through a different route. The question is again one of whether the 
observed higher tenure in works council plants results from the greater 
attractiveness/efficiency of workplaces with works councils or instead reflects the 
outcome of rent-seeking process (vulgo: the ‘voice’ versus ‘monopoly’ arguments 
adapted to the works council institution). We carry out this test by implementing 
the Freeman-Medoff tenure model for unions in which the two effects –voice and 
monopoly – are assumed to be captured simply by looking at the corresponding 
elasticity.9   
 (Table 6 near here) 
The results are given in Table 6. As in our equations (4) and (5) above, this 
approach assumes away the simultaneity bias arising from the possibility that 
wages increase with tenure and also the possibility that innately more stable 
individuals might select into works council establishments (Freeman, 1980, claims 
that both biases are of a second order of magnitude). In fact, the voice/efficiency 
argument seems to dominate the monopoly argument: the presence of a works 
council implies a 40 percent increase in job tenure, while roughly a 70 percent 
increase in wages would be required to obtain an equivalent percentage increase in 
job tenure. Interestingly, these numbers are of the same order of magnitude as 
those reported by Freeman and Medoff for the U.S. (1984, Table 6-2). 
As a final robustness check on our results, we offer further evidence for a 
more homogeneous sub-sample of establishments. In order to capture an 
establishment size bracket with comparable formal powers of works councils and 
a relatively even distribution of establishments with and without works councils, 
we restrict ourselves to establishments with between 21 and 100 employees. This 
sub-sample of smaller establishments contains many fewer individuals (some 
100,000 workers in 3,000 establishments). Descriptive statistics are contained in 
Appendix Table 4a, from which it can be seen again that for works council 
establishments, average (log) wages are higher and that job tenure is higher. 
Employees´ qualifications and age in these establishments are also slightly higher. 
Establishments with works councils finally are less prone to report high profits, 
modern technical equipment, or overtime supplements. 
As can be seen from Appendix Tables 4b through 4e, there is a clear 
reduction in the works council premium in the sub-sample of establishments 
employing 21 to 100 employees.10 At the risk of some over-simplification, the 
wage effect of works councils is reduced by 30 to 50 percent in comparison with 
the results for the entire sample. This provides evidence that establishment size 
matters. Works councils are again more favorable to women than men, but the role 
of councils in reducing wage dispersion is less visible. Indeed, differences in 
coefficients estimates in the quantile regressions are minimal, and even increase 
for men (see Appendix Table 4e). As a consequence the impact of works councils 
on the standard deviation of wages is positive, while it is negative but smaller than 
for the entire sample in the case of the other (coefficient of variation) measure.  
Finally, there is evidence that works councils significantly increase job 
tenure also in the restricted sample (by an extra 0.8 years), but no evidence that 
increased tenure comes about through via higher wages as the interaction term 
(predicted wages*works council) is never statistically significant (in Appendix 
Table 4f). The results from the Freeman-Medoff model suggest in turn that the 
voice argument is less important for this employment size interval than for other 
establishments: the works council dummy is clearly smaller while the wage impact 
on tenure is comparable (see Appendix Table 4g and compare with Table 6). 
  
VI. Conclusions     
This paper has looked at the works council impact on the anatomy of wages in 
Germany. It has demonstrated that the positive impact of the entity on wages is 
higher than that of collective bargaining proper either at sectoral or establishment 
level. Works councils are, then, associated with a wage premium despite the fact 
that they are formally enjoined not to engage in wage bargaining. To our 
knowledge, this is the first occasion on which this result has been reported for 
matched-employer-employee data, although it has been observed before in 
establishment panel data sets using information on average earnings. But note that 
in the present treatment we were able to control for unobserved worker and 
establishment heterogeneity while also accounting for the selection of plants into 
works council status. 
Another important result, generated from our quantile regressions, was that 
the wage effect tends to be greatest lower down in the earnings distribution, 
analogous to results reported for formal collective bargaining. As a consequence, 
works councils reduce the standard deviation of wages and the coefficient of 
variation of wages in a manner comparable to collective bargaining. In contrast to 
the literature on collective wage agreements, however, we found that women 
profit more from the presence of works councils than do men and that, 
accordingly, works councils attenuate the gender wage gap. Wage compression is 
higher in Germany than in most other industrialized countries (Fitzenberger, 
1999), and is associated with high and persistent unemployment that mainly 
affects lower-skilled employees and those who previously worked in jobs at the 
bottom end of the wage distribution (Siebert, 1997). Although there are many 
different explanations for why wages in Germany are so compressed (and remain 
so), few if any of them seem to be convincing (Muysken and Zwick, 2006). 
Subject to the caveat provided by our results for the restricted firm sample, the 
institution of works councils therefore is an interesting additional explanation that 
has previously received scant attention.  
 Finally, we also investigated whether the longer tenure of employees in 
works councils establishments reflected higher wages, signaling rent extraction, or 
compensating differentials. Once we interacted predicted wages from an equation 
describing wages of employees in establishments without works councils with the 
works council dummy à la Card and de la Rica (2006), we found that only a small 
part of the higher wages seem to indicate rent seeking. This finding was confirmed 
by comparing the direct effect of wages and works councils on tenure using the 
Freeman-Medoff (1984) approach. 
 
Endnotes 
1 Rather, the wage relation observed is between union density and wages and even 
here the link is indirect. 
2 Earlier research looking into the wage gap either reports no works council effect 
or even a negative influence (see, respectively, Meyer 1995b; Bellman and 
Kohaut, 1995). 
3 The authors use two works council variables, the second identifying situations in 
which works councils are reportedly not involved in determining the wage gap. 
The omitted category is absence of a works council of any form. 
4 Hübler and Jirjahn (2003) argue that it is the interest of both the employer side at 
industry/regional level and the union to prevent works councils from rent seeking. 
5 As a matter of fact, 49 percent of establishments in western Germany are covered 
by sectoral collective agreements and these agreements apply to some 65 percent 
of employees.  
6 For example, assuming iii ae ε+=  and iajaii aFXa ′++= μφ1 , it follows that 
)()()( 11 iiajjaii aFBZBXy εμδφ +′+++++= . In this case, we can conclude that 
both olsB1 and 
olsδ from model (1) will be biased as the corresponding measured 
effects will include the biases aφ and aμ , respectively (Card and de la Rica, 2006). 
7 The other skill levels are evenly distributed across works council and non-works 
council establishments. 
8 Interquantile regression comparisons show that the presence of works councils 
has a significant impact on the differences between the first and fifth as well as 
between the fifth and ninth quantiles for women and men. The difference in 
coefficients [with t-values in brackets] for men (women) are: -0.02 [15.05 ](-0.07 
[27.93]) for the difference between 1st and 5th  quantile and -0.04 [18.47] (-0.05 
[19.12]) for the difference between the 5th and 9th quantile. 
9 Ignoring other covariates, the log-tenure model can be formulated as follows: 
iicWocoiWagebaiT ω+++= lnln . A theoretical derivation of this model can be 
found in Freeman (1980, p. 649). 
10 Compare Appendix Table 4b with Table 2a, Appendix Table 4c with Table 2b, 
Appendix Table 4d with Table 3, or Appendix Table 4e with Table 4. Full results 
are available from the authors on request. 
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Table 1a: Descriptive Statistics (Individual Level) 
Sample  
 
 
 
Variable 
 
All 
workers 
Workers in 
establishments 
with works 
councils 
Workers in 
establishments 
without works 
councils 
 
Males 
 
Females 
(log) Wages 4.54 4.59 4.13 4.61 4.37 
Tenure (in years) 9.81 10.01 5.20 9.98 7.82 
Fraction female  0.28 0.27 0.34   
Age (years) 40.9 41.0 40.0 41.4 40.0 
Fraction in western 
Germany 
0.79 0.82 0.54 0.83 0.70 
Fraction foreign 0.08 0.09 0.05 0.09 0.06 
Distribution by skill level: 
   Unskilled blue collar 
   Low skilled blue collar 
   Highly skilled blue collar 
   White collar 
 
0.25 
0.25 
0.02 
0.48 
 
0.26 
0.23 
0.02 
0.49 
 
0.24 
0.34 
0.02 
0.40 
 
0.27 
0.33 
0.02 
0.38 
 
0.21 
0.07 
0.00 
0.72 
Distribution by 
establishment size: 
    5-19 
    20-99 
    100-249 
    250-499 
    500-999 
    ≥1000 
 
 
0.01 
0.08 
0.11 
0.13 
0.18 
0.49 
 
 
0.00 
0.04 
0.09 
0.13 
0.19 
0.55 
 
 
0.12 
0.41 
0.24 
0.13 
0.07 
0.02 
 
 
0.01 
0.07 
0.10 
0.13 
0.16 
0.52 
 
 
0.02 
0.08 
0.11 
0.15 
0.21 
0.42 
Distribution by schooling 
level: 
    Seceduc1 
    Seceduc2 
    Terteduc1 
    Terteduc2 
    Polytechnic 
    University 
 
 
0.13 
0.64 
0.01 
0.05 
0.05 
0.08 
 
 
0.14 
0.64 
0.01 
0.05 
0.05 
0.08 
 
 
0.11 
0.66 
0.01 
0.03 
0.03 
0.04 
 
 
0.13 
0.64 
0.01 
0.04 
0.05 
0.08 
 
 
0.14 
0.63 
0.01 
0.08 
0.03 
0.07 
Fraction covered by 
collective agreement: 
    at sector level 
    at establishment level 
 
 
0.73 
0.15 
 
 
0.78 
0.16 
 
 
0.35 
0.07 
 
 
0.73 
0.16 
 
 
0.73 
0.12 
High profits 0.31 0.31 0.33 0.33 0.26 
Modern technical 
equipment 
0.75 0.75 0.72 0.74 0.75 
Overtime supplement 22.58 22.69 21.25 25.31 15.58 
Export 0.43 0.44 0.29 0.48 0.29 
Fraction covered by works 
councils 
0.90 
 
  0.91 0.88 
Number of observations 1,344,65
6 
1,171,597 130,811 966,762 377,894 
Notes: A description of the variables is provided in Appendix Table 1.  
Source: LIAB Wave 2001. 
Table 1b: Descriptive Statistics (Establishment Level) 
Sample   
 
 
Variable 
All 
establishment
s 
Establishmen
ts with works 
councils 
Establishments 
with no works 
councils 
 
Males 
 
Female
s 
(log) Wages 4.229     4.440  4.067  4.32     4.06  
Tenure (in years) 6.86 8.4    5.7 7.1 6.4 
Female 0.37 0.35 0.38   
Age (years) 40.6     41.6     39.8 41.0     39.9    
Fraction in western 
Germany  
0.62 0.69 0.56 0.62 0.61 
Fraction foreign  0.05 0.05 0.04 0.05 0.04 
Distribution by skill level: 
    Unskilled blue collar 
    Low skilled blue collar 
    Highly skilled blue 
collar 
    White collar 
 
0.18 
0.32 
0.02 
0.48 
 
0.20 
0.22 
0.02 
0.54 
 
0.17 
0.37 
0.02 
0.42 
 
0.20 
0.43 
0.03 
0.34 
 
0.15 
0.09 
0.04 
0.72 
Distribution by 
establishment size: 
      5-19 
      20-99 
    100-249 
    250-499 
    500-999 
    ≥1000 
 
 
0.32 
0.35 
0.14 
0.09 
0.06 
0.04 
 
 
0.06 
0.30 
0.24 
0.17 
0.12 
0.10 
 
 
0.52 
0.38 
0.07 
0.02 
0.01 
0.00 
 
 
0.30 
0.36 
0.15 
0.09 
0.06 
0.04 
 
 
0.36 
0.33 
0.13 
0.08 
0.06 
0.04 
Distribution by schooling 
level: 
    Seceduc1 
    Seceduc2 
    Terteduc1 
    Terteduc2 
    Polytechnic 
    University 
 
 
0.10 
0.67 
0.01 
0.04 
0.03 
0.05 
 
 
0.12 
0.67 
0.01 
0.05 
0.05 
0.07 
 
 
0.08 
0.68 
0.00 
0.03 
0.03 
0.03 
 
 
0.09 
0.68 
0.01 
0.03 
0.04 
0.05 
 
 
0.09 
0.66 
0.01 
0.05 
0.03 
0.05 
Fraction covered by 
collective agreement: 
    at sector level 
    at establishment level 
 
 
0.53 
0.08 
 
 
0.71 
0.13 
 
 
0.39 
0.05 
 
 
0.54 
0.08 
 
 
0.51 
0.09 
High profits 0.26 0.24 0.28 0.27 0.25 
Modern technical 
equipment 
0.69 0.71 0.67 0.68 0.70 
Overtime supplement 17.10 17.9 16.38 20.32 11.48 
Export 0.23 0.32 0.16 0.28 0.16 
Fraction covered by works 
councils 
0.44   0.45 0.42 
Number of observations 8,579 3,589 4,612 5,451 3,128 
 Notes: A description of the variables is provided in Appendix Table 1.  
Source: LIAB Wave 2001. 
Table 2a: The Determinants of (Log) Wages, All Workers 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Works council 0.460 
(0.019) 
0.132 
(0.011) 
0.111 
(0.010) 
0.114   
(0.010) 
Worker characteristics:     
    Gender (female)  -0.204 
(0.005) 
-0.183 
(0.003) 
-0.182   
(0.003) 
Tenure (in years)  0.014 
(0.001) 
0.014 
(0.001) 
0.014 
(0.000) 
    Tenure2  -0.000 
(0.000) 
-0.000   
(0.000) 
-0.000   
(0.000) 
    Age  0.031 
(0.001) 
0.031 
(0.001) 
0.031    
(0.001) 
    Age2  -0.000 
(0.000) 
-0.000   
(0.000) 
-0.000   
(0.000) 
   Seceduc2  0.058   
(0.006) 
0.058   
(0.005) 
0.057    
(0.005) 
   Terteduc1  0.048   
(0.020) 
0.033   
(0.019) 
0.032   
 (0.020) 
   Terteduc2  0.131   
(0.008) 
0.127   
(0.007) 
0.124 
  (0.007) 
   Polytechnic  0.276   
(0.008) 
0.272   
(0.008) 
0.270 
(0.007) 
   University  0.420   
(0.011) 
0.413   
(0.011) 
0.411 
(0.011) 
   Unskilled blue collar  -0.067 
(0.007) 
-0.073 
(0.005) 
-0.075   
(0.005) 
   Highly skilled blue collar  0.276 
(0.009) 
0.258 
(0.008) 
0.259   
(0.008) 
   White collar  0.276 
(0.006) 
0.234 
(0.005) 
0.236   
(0.005) 
    Foreigner  -0.006 
0.004 
-0.010   
0.004 
-0.013   
0.0041 
Establishment characteristics:     
  western Germany  0.231 
(0.008) 
0.195     
0.008 
0.192 
0.008 
   size20_99  0.036 
(0.153) 
0.028 
(0.014) 
0.027   
(0.014) 
   size100_249  0.049 
(0.017) 
0.041 
(0.016) 
0.038   
(0.016) 
Table 2a (continued) 
   size250_499  0.072 
(0.018) 
0.065 
(0.017) 
0.061 
(0.017) 
   size500_999  0.112 
(0.018) 
0.104 
(0.017) 
0.098 
(0.017) 
   size1000  0.159 
(0.019) 
0.145 
(0.018) 
0.111   
(0.018) 
   Collective agreement: 
        at sector level 
 
        at establishment level 
  
  
0.054 
(0.010) 
0.062 
(0.014) 
 
0.055 
(0.009) 
0.061 
(0.013) 
 
0.052 
(0.009) 
0.056 
(0.013) 
  Payment above collective agreement 
 
 0.027 
(0.008) 
0.025 
(0.007) 
0.025 
(0.007) 
High profits  0.014 
(0.008) 
0.017 
(0.008) 
0.021 
(0.007) 
Modern technical equipment  0.008 
(0.008) 
0.002 
(0.008) 
-0.001 
0.008 
Overtime supplement  0.001 
(0.000) 
0.001 
(0.000) 
0.001 
(0.000) 
Export  -.002 
(0. 012) 
-0.003 
(0.011) 
0.005 
(0.009) 
Establishment-average worker 
characteristics: 
    
   Average female    -0.233 
(0.026) 
-0.225   
(0.025) 
   Average age     0.001 
(0.001) 
-0.000   
(0.001) 
   Average unskilled blue collar     -0.772 
(0.063) 
-0.801   
(0.068) 
   Average low skilled blue collar   -0.842    
(0.064) 
-0.892   
(0.069) 
   Average highly skilled blue collar      -0.606 
(0.092) 
-0.706   
(0.111) 
   Average white collar   -0.575 
(0.063) 
-0.609   
(0.068) 
  Average foreigners   0.069 
(0.043) 
0.031 
(0.038) 
Propensity score    0.002   
(0.0005) 
R2 0.11 0.61 0.62 0.63 
F 612.03 999.16 1,317.51 1,345.75 
N 1,293,969 1,269,599 1,269,599 1,248,506 
Number of establishments 8,197 8,178 8,178 8,131 
 Notes: Dependent variable: log wages. Standard errors are in parentheses and are 
adjusted for clustering at the establishment level and are heterogeneity robust. Model 
specifications are given by equations (1) through (3) in the text. The model includes 
industry dummies in addition to the arguments shown in the table. 
 
Table 2b: The Determinants of Log Wages by Gender  
 Males Females 
Works council 0.088 
(0.010) 
0.153 
(0.014) 
Worker characteristics:   
Tenure (in years) 0.014 
(0.0001) 
0.015 
(0.001) 
    Age 0.028 
(0.001) 
0.036 
(0.002) 
    Age2 -0.0003 
(0.000) 
-0.000 
(0.000) 
   Seceduc2 0.056 
(0.005) 
0.057 
(0.008) 
   Terteduc1 0.062 
(0.017) 
-0.019 
(0.031) 
   Terteduc2 0.123 
(0.008) 
0.128 
(0.009) 
   Polytechnic 0.267 
(0.008) 
0.260 
(0.011) 
   University 0.410 
(0.010) 
0.431 
(0.014) 
    Unskilled blue collar -0.077 
(0.005) 
-0.079 
(0.008) 
    Highly skilled blue collar 0.260 
(0.008) 
0.259 
(0.020) 
    White collar 0.253 
(0.005) 
0.187 
(0.008) 
    Foreigner -0.014  
 (0.005) 
-0.008 
( 0.004) 
Establishment characteristics:   
  western Germany 0.231 
(0.008) 
0.144 
(0.009) 
  size20_99 0.027 
(0.008) 
0.018 
(0.031) 
  size100_249 0.037 
(0.011) 
0.033 
(0.031) 
size250_499 
 
0.059 
(0.012) 
0.058 
(0.033) 
size500_999 
 
0.092 
(0.013) 
0.100 
(0.032) 
  size1000 0.101 
(0.014) 
0.116 
(0.034) 
Table 2b (cont.) 
Collective agreement 
    sector level 
  
    establishment level 
 
 
0.049 
(0.010) 
0.061 
(0.013) 
 
0.055 
(0.011) 
0.046 
(0.017) 
Payment above collective agreement 
 
0.020 
(0.008) 
0.024 
(0.010) 
High profits 0.024 
(0.007) 
0.016 
(0.010) 
Modern technical equipment 0.009 
(0.007) 
-0.015 
(0.010) 
Overtime supplement 0.001 
(0.000) 
0.001 
(0.000) 
Export -0.004 
(0.008) 
0.023 
(0.012) 
Establishment-average worker 
characteristics: 
  
   Average female  -0.211 
(0.234) 
-0.219 
(0.031) 
   Average age   -0.001 
(0.001) 
0.002 
(0.002) 
   Average unskilled blue collar   -0.781 
(0.065) 
-0.907 
(0.161) 
   Average low skilled blue collar -0.857 
(0.065) 
-1.034 
(0.163) 
   Average highly skilled blue collar    -0.609 
(0.108) 
-0.889 
(0.184) 
   Average white collar -0.614 
(0.065) 
-0.670 
(0.160) 
Average foreigners -0.211 
(0.024) 
-0.022 
(0.085) 
Propensity score 0.002 
(0.000) 
0.004 
(0.001) 
R2 0.64 0.54 
F 1056.26 421.24 
N 895,957 352,549 
Number of establishments 7,581 7,399 
Notes: see Notes to Table 2a. 
 
 
 
 
Table 3: The Determinants of (Log) Wages by Schooling Level 
 Seceduc1 Seceduc2 Terteduc1 Terteduc2 
Works council 0.112 
(0.021) 
0.123 
(0.012) 
0.195 
(0.093) 
0.055 
(0.015) 
Worker characteristics:     
    Gender (female) -0.133 
(0.001) 
-0.185 
(0.003) 
-0.167 
(0.012) 
-0.139 
(0.005) 
Tenure (in years) 0.011 
(0.001) 
0.011 
(0.001) 
0.024 
(0.003) 
0.009 
(0.001) 
    Tenure2 -0.000 
(0.000) 
-0.000 
(0.000) 
-0.001 
(0.000) 
-0.000 
(0.000) 
    Age 0.026 
(0.002) 
0.261 
(0.001) 
0.103 
(0.008) 
0.068 
(0.002) 
    Age2 -0.000 
(0.000) 
-0.000 
(0.000) 
-0.001 
(0.000) 
-0.000 
(0.000) 
    Unskilled blue collar -0.065 
(0.007) 
-0.072 
(0.005) 
-0.013 
(0.027) 
-0.065 
(0.012) 
    Highly skilled blue collar 0.263 
(0.035) 
0.269 
(0.008) 
0.164 
(0.057) 
0.234 
(0.012) 
    White collar 0.149 
(0.013) 
0.228 
(0.004) 
0.333 
(0.025) 
0.290 
(0.009) 
    Foreigner 0.008 
(0.004) 
-0.009 
(0.003) 
-0.046 
(0.022) 
-0.021   
(0.009) 
Establishment characteristics:     
   western Germany 0.178   
(0.019) 
0.187 
(0.008) 
0.090 
(0.049) 
0.174 
(0.011) 
  size20_99 -0.010 
(0.019) 
0.039 
(0.008) 
0.025 
(0.079) 
0.097 
(0.025) 
  size100_249 -0.024 
(0.022) 
0.052 
(0.011) 
-0.020 
(0.096) 
0.121 
(0.026) 
size250_499 
 
0.057 
(0.025) 
0.070 
(0.014) 
0.019 
(0.116) 
0.141 
(0.027) 
size500_999 
 
0.093 
(0.024) 
0.110 
(0.014) 
0.054 
(0.103) 
0.167 
(0.026) 
  size1000 0.105 
(0.025) 
0.123 
(0.015) 
0.086 
(0.109) 
0.190 
(0.028) 
Table 3 (cont.) 
Collective agreement: 
    on sector level 
 
    on establishment level 
 
  
 
0.062 
(0.014) 
0.087 
(0.018) 
 
0.061 
(0.010) 
0.065 
(0.014) 
 
0.111 
(0.069) 
0.129 
(0.074) 
 
0.050 
(0.014) 
0.107 
(0.020) 
Payment above collective agreement 0.005 
(0.010) 
0.024 
(0.008) 
-0.006 
(0.023) 
0.035 
(0.009) 
High profits 0.038 
(0.010) 
0.024 
(0.008) 
-0.010 
(0.025) 
0.019 
(0.010) 
Modern technical equipment 0.022 
(0.010) 
-0.005 
(0.008) 
0.062 
(0.033) 
-0.015 
(0.011) 
Overtime supplement 0.001 
(0.000) 
0.001 
(0.000) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
0.001 
(0.000) 
Export -0.027 
(0.010) 
0.006 
(0.009) 
0.013 
(0.038) 
0.006 
(0.013) 
Establishment-average worker 
characteristics: 
    
   Average female  -0.296 
(0.031) 
-0.225 
(0.023) 
-0.247 
(0.092) 
-0.140 
(0.031) 
   Average age   0.006 
(0.002) 
0.000 
(0.001) 
0.005 
(0.005) 
-0.001 
(0.002) 
   Average unskilled blue collar   -5.684 
(7.300) 
-0.570 
(0.313) 
-4.848 
(15.278) 
-0.430 
(0.305) 
   Average low skilled blue collar -5.770 
(7.301) 
-0.663 
(0.313) 
-4.848 
(15.276) 
-0.520 
(0.306) 
   Average highly skilled blue collar    -5.935 
(7.301) 
-0.423 
(0.324) 
-4.909 
(15.278) 
-0.136 
(0.319) 
   Average white collar -5.555 
(7.300) 
-0.381 
(0.312) 
-4.617 
(15.276) 
-0.244 
(0.305) 
   Average foreigners 0.044 
(0.037) 
0.068 
(0.036) 
0.367 
(0.156) 
0.211 
(0.063) 
Propensity score 0.002 
(0.000) 
0.003 
(0.000) 
0.000 
(0.002) 
0.002 
(0.000) 
R2 0.54 0.60 0.51 0.51 
F 176.8 798.79 62.98 356.87 
N 167,520 796,984 9,915 63,873 
Number of establishments 4,221 7,719 1,632 3,723 
Notes: see Table 2a. 
 
Table 3: The Determinants of (Log) Wages by Schooling Level 
 Polytechnic University 
Works council 0.115 
(0.015) 
0.087   
(0.025) 
Worker characteristics:   
    Gender (female) -0.150 
  (0.005) 
-0.123   
(0.004) 
Tenure (in years) 0.013 
(0.001) 
0.020 
(0.001) 
    Tenure2 -0.000 
 (0.000) 
-0.000   
(0.000) 
    Age 0.053 
(0.002) 
0.055  
(0.003) 
    Age2 -0.001 
(0.000) 
-0.001    
(0.000) 
    Unskilled blue collar -0.106 
(0.025) 
-0.174  
(0.027) 
    Highly skilled blue collar 0.276 
(0.020) 
0.401  
(0.036) 
    White collar 0.423 
(0.015) 
0.551 
(0.019) 
    Foreigner -0.023 
(0.010) 
-0.071 
(0.007) 
Establishment characteristics:   
  western Germany 0.275 
(0.012) 
0.234 
(0.011) 
  size20-99 -0.064 
(0.026) 
0.022 
(0.045) 
  size100-249 -0.087 
(0.027) 
0.061   
(0.046) 
size250_499 
 
0.112 
(0.028) 
0.103 
(0.047) 
size500_999 
 
0.127 
(0.028) 
0.136 
(0.047) 
  size1000 0.121 
(0.028) 
0.150 
(0.047) 
High profits 0.009 
(0.007) 
0.014 
(0.008) 
Modern technical equipment 0.023 
(0.009) 
0.016 
(0.009) 
Overtime supplement 0.001 
(0.000) 
0.001 
(0.000) 
Export 0.010 
(0.009) 
0.015 
(0.011) 
Table 3 (cont.) 
Establishment-average worker 
characteristics: 
  
   Average female  -0.141  
(0.030) 
-0.062   
(0.031) 
   Average age   -0.004 
(0.002) 
-0.003   
(0.002) 
   Average unskilled blue collar   0.515 
 (0.732) 
-0.516 
(0.322) 
   Average low skilled blue collar 0.500 
(0.732) 
-0.608   
(0.322) 
   Average highly skilled blue collar    0.707 
 (0.738) 
-0.431  
(0.355) 
   Average white collar 0.653 
(0.731) 
-0.366   
(0.323) 
   Average foreigners 0.223 
(0.051) 
0.216 
(0.062) 
Propensity score 0.002 
(0.000) 
0.001   
(0.000) 
R2 0.55 0.45 
F 373.58 351.97 
N 56,920 97,309 
Number of establishments 3,499 3,554 
Notes: See Notes to Table 2a. 
Table 4: Quantile (Log) Wage Regressions by Works Council Coverage and 
Gender 
Quantiles  
0.20 0.40 0.60 0.80 
Complete Sample: 
Works council 
 
 
Collective agreement at 
sector level 
 
Collective agreement at 
establishment level 
 
 
Pseudo- R2 
 
0.140 
(0.001) 
 
0.071 
(0.001) 
 
0.077 
(0.001) 
 
 
0.43 
 
0.122 
(0.001) 
 
0.058 
(0.001) 
 
0.075 
(0.001) 
 
 
0.42 
 
0.104 
(0.001) 
 
0.050 
(0.001) 
 
0.070 
(0.001) 
 
 
0.43 
 
0.086 
(0.001) 
 
0.038 
(0.001) 
 
0.060 
(0.001) 
 
 
0.44 
Males: 
Works council 
 
 
Collective agreement on 
sector level 
 
 
Collective agreement on 
establishment level 
 
 
Pseudo- R2 
 
0.110 
(0.001) 
 
0.067 
(0.001) 
 
 
0.080 
(0.001) 
 
 
0.44 
 
0.096 
(0.001) 
 
0.056 
(0.001) 
 
 
0.079 
(0.001) 
 
 
0.43 
 
0.080 
(0.001) 
 
0.047 
(0.001) 
 
 
0.072 
(0.002) 
 
 
0.44 
 
0.067 
(0.001) 
 
0.033 
(0.001) 
 
 
0.059 
(0.001) 
 
 
0.45 
Females: 
Works council 
 
 
Collective agreement at 
sector level 
 
 
Collective agreement at 
establishment level 
 
 
Pseudo- R2 
 
0.189 
(0.002) 
 
0.073 
(0.002) 
 
 
0.064 
(0.002) 
 
 
0.38 
 
0.174 
(0.002) 
 
0.058 
(0.001) 
 
 
0.059 
(0.002) 
 
 
0.37 
 
0.145 
(0.002) 
 
0.047 
(0.001) 
 
 
0.056 
(0.002) 
 
 
0.37 
 
0.120 
(0.002) 
 
0.041 
(0.002) 
 
 
0.058 
(0.002) 
 
 
0.38 
Notes: Dependent variable: log wages. Standard errors are in parentheses. Model 
specifications are given by equations (1) through (3) in the text. The mode uses the 
covariates shown in column (4) of Table 2a. 
 
 
Table 5: The Determinants of Tenure: The Card/de la Rica Model 
All workers Males Females  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Works council 1.566 
(0.230) 
-2.873   
(1.903) 
1.538 
(0.270) 
-3.101 
(2.244) 
1.519 
(0.245) 
0.037 
(2.209) 
Predicted (log) wage*works 
council  
- 1.064 
(0.453) 
- 1.086 
(0.526) 
- 0.372 
(0.561) 
Worker characteristics:       
   Gender (female) -0.521 
(0.101) 
-0.251 
(0.135) 
    
   Seceduc2 -0.233   
(0.203) 
-0.242   
(0.203) 
-0.163 
(0.237) 
-0.169 
(0.236) 
-0.794   
(0.181) 
-0.799 
(0.182) 
   Terteduc1 -2.927   
(0.326) 
-2.771   
(0.330) 
-3.232  
(0.390) 
-3.063    
(0.399) 
-2.607   
(0.249) 
-2.557   
(0.258) 
   Terteduc2 -2.387   
(0.394) 
-2.521   
(0.403) 
-2.615   
(0.519) 
-2.748   
(0.527) 
-2.539   
(0.239) 
-2.588   
(0.253) 
   Polytechnic -3.440   
(0.315) 
-3.676   
(0.346) 
-3.606   
(0.353) 
-3.840 
(0.386) 
-3.194   
(0.267) 
-3.272   
(0.293) 
   University -4.136   
(0.375) 
-4.516   
(0.435) 
-4.319   
(0.418) 
-4.698 
(0.490) 
-3.784   
(0.323) 
-3.915   
(0.373) 
   Unskilled blue collar -1.240 
(0.098) 
-1.125 
(0.285) 
-1.175 
(0.323) 
-1.056 
(0.312) 
-0.811 
(0.224) 
-0.765 
(0.219) 
   Highly skilled blue collar 1.200 
(0.512) 
0.910 
(0.498) 
1.014 
(0.488) 
0.716 
(0.485) 
2.000 
(0.495) 
1.924  
(0.502) 
   White collar 0.022 
(0.210) 
-0.249 
(0.241) 
-0.084 
(0.226) 
-0.371 
(0.253) 
0.764 
(0.196) 
0.684 
(0.238) 
   Foreigner  -0.322   
(0.193) 
-0.280   
(0.193) 
-0.332   
(0.215) 
-0.290  
(0.215) 
-0.395   
(0.209) 
    -0.379 
    (0.209) 
Establishment 
characteristics: 
      
  western Germany 3.881   
(0.269) 
3.620   
(0.257) 
4.182  
(0.327) 
3.919 
(0.324) 
3.112 
(0.219) 
3.019 
(0.222) 
  size20_99 -0.605 
(0.304) 
-0.587 
(0.309) 
-0.212 
(0.235) 
-0.174 
(0.236) 
-1.078 
(0.360) 
-1.090 
(0.363) 
  size100_249 -0.583 
(0.359) 
-0.592 
(0.364) 
-0.172 
(0.321) 
-0.150 
(0.322) 
-1.001 
(0.396) 
-1.027 
(0.400) 
size250_499 
 
-0.254 
(0.377) 
-0.243 
(0.382) 
0.167 
(0.354) 
0.212 
(0.354) 
-0.764 
(0.407) 
-0.783 
(0.411) 
size500_999 
 
0.258 
(0.404) 
0.185 
(0.411) 
0.699 
(0.394) 
0.655 
(0.401) 
-0.314 
(0.419) 
-0.361 
(0.430) 
  size1000 1.664 
(0.550) 
1.547 
(0.545) 
2.450 
(0.583) 
2.361 
(0.401) 
0.172 
(0.493) 
0.111 
(0.430) 
Table 5 (cont.) 
High profits 0.411 
(0.409) 
0.388 
(0.410) 
0.625 
(0.454) 
0.604 
(0.455) 
-0.264 
(0.317) 
-0.273 
(0.316) 
Modern technical equipment -0.508 
(0.415) 
-0.557 
(0.411) 
-0.711 
(0.471) 
-0.760 
(0.465) 
0.080 
(0.323) 
0.062 
(0.319) 
Overtime supplement -0.001 
(0.008) 
-0.001 
(0.008) 
-0.002 
(0.008) 
-0.003 
(0.008) 
0.001 
(0.008) 
0.001 
(0.007) 
Export -0.895 
(0.655) 
-0.949 
(0.653) 
-1.007 
(0.692) 
-1.007 
(0.692) 
-0.295 
(0.510) 
-0.311 
(0.509) 
Collective agreement: 
    at sector level 
 
    at establishment level 
 
 
0.431 
(0.282) 
0.980 
(0.572) 
 
0.419 
(0.282) 
0.983 
(0.572) 
 
0.308 
(0.361) 
0.938 
(0.625) 
 
0.329 
(0.384) 
0.989 
(0.673) 
 
0.637 
(0.209) 
0.838 
(0.504) 
 
0.632 
(0.210) 
0.842 
(0.504) 
Payment above collective 
agreement 
0.197 
(0.583) 
0.134 
(0.585) 
0.345 
(0.709) 
0.300 
(0.763) 
-0.200 
(0.338) 
-0.226 
(0.338) 
R2 0.35 0.35 0.36 0.36 0.30 0.30 
F 77.75 81.33 64.78 68.90 66.42 67.35 
N 1,277,90
3 
1,277,90
3 
916,584 916,584 361,31
9 
361,319 
Number of establishments 8,182 8,182 7,621 7,621 7,455 7,455 
Notes: Model specifications are given by equations (4) and (5) in the text. Dependent 
variable: tenure in years. Standard errors (clustered by establishment and heterogeneity 
robust) are in parentheses. The model includes industry dummies. Dummies for each year of 
age were also included in the specification. 
 
Table 6: The Determinants of Tenure: The Freeman/Medoff Tenure Model 
 Coefficient (s.e.) 
(log) Wage 0.645 (0.029) 
Works council 0.384 (0.044) 
Worker characteristics:  
Gender (female) 0.193 (0.015) 
Age 0.045 (0.001) 
Unskilled blue collar -0.172 (0.034) 
Highly skilled blue collar -0.093 (0.045) 
White collar -0.454 (0.027) 
Foreigner -0.100 (0.026) 
Establishment characteristics:  
western Germany -0.027 (0.038) 
size20_99 -0.214 (0.054) 
size100_249 -0.286 (0.062) 
size250_499 
 
-0.277 (0.066) 
size500_999 
 
-0.246 (0.071) 
size1000 -0.102 (0.078) 
Collective agreement 
    on sector level 
    on establishment level 
 
0.112 (0.041) 
0.133 (0.073) 
Payment above collective agreement 
 
-0.032 (0.068) 
High profits 0.023 (0.047) 
Modern technical equipment -0.046 (0.049) 
Overtime supplement -0.000 (0.049) 
Export -0.036 (0.069) 
R2 0.26 
F 200.31 
N 1,269,599 
Number of establishments 8,178 
Notes: Dependent variable: (log) tenure in years. OLS regressions, standard errors (clustered 
by establishment and heterogeneity robust) are in parentheses. The model includes industry 
dummies.  
 
Appendix Table 1: Description of Variables 
Variable Definition 
(a) 
Wages Daily (log) gross wage (in €). Information on wages in the administrative data is 
right censored at the upper earnings limit for social security contributions. For such 
individuals, the predicted wage was obtained using separate Tobit regressions of the 
daily wage on tenure, tenure square, skill category, plant location (western vs. 
eastern Germany) and industry dummies. These separate Tobit regressions were 
defined according to gender, education level, and nationality, in a total of 20 
different cells. 
Sex Dummy: 1 if worker is female, 0 otherwise. 
Tenure Number of days since beginning work at the current establishment. 
Employee skill 
groups 
Employees in the raw administrative records were classified into four groups: three 
blue-collar worker categories (comprising the unskilled, low skilled, and highly 
skilled) and one aggregate white-collar category made up of all white-collar grades. 
The residual categories of home-workers, part-time workers, and apprentices were 
dropped from the sample. 
Nationality Dummy: 1 if worker has a non-German nationality, 0 otherwise. 
Employee 
schooling 
groups 
Employees in the raw administrative records were classified into six categories 
according to their education level: Seceduc1 (individuals without a completed 
apprenticeship and without an Abitur), Seceduc2 (individuals with a completed 
apprenticeship and without an Abitur), Terteduc1 (individuals without a completed 
apprenticeship and with an Abitur), Terteduc2 (individuals with a completed 
apprenticeship and with an Abitur), Polytechnic (individuals with a Polytechnic 
degree), and University (individuals with an University degree). 
(b) 
Works council Dummy: 1 if works council is present, 0 otherwise. 
Western 
Germany 
Dummy: 1 if the establishment is in western Germany, 0 otherwise. 
Profits Dummy: 1 if the establishment reports a “good profit situation in 2001”, 0 otherwise. 
Collective 
agreement 
Dummy: 1 if the establishment is covered by a collective agreement, 0 otherwise. 
Payment above 
collective 
agreement 
Dummy: 1 if payment is above collective bargaining tariff, 0 otherwise. 
Modern 
technical 
equipment 
Modern technology dummy: 1 if the plant’s equipment is either state-of-the art or up-
to-date compared with other firms in the same industry, 0 otherwise. 
Paid overtime  Share of employees who receive paid overtime hours. 
Export market Dummy: 1 if the percentage share of exports in the establishment’s annual turnover 
is greater than zero, 0 otherwise. 
Size20_99 Dummy: 1 if the number of employees is between 19 and 99, 0 otherwise. 
Size100_249 Dummy: 1 if the number of employees is between 99 and 250, 0 otherwise. 
Size250_499 Dummy: 1 if the number of employees is between 249 and 500, 0 otherwise. 
Size500_999 Dummy: 1 if the number of employees is between 499 and 1,000, 0 otherwise. 
Size1000 Dummy: 1 if the number of employees is greater than 999, 0 otherwise. 
Notes: Variables in panel (a) were extracted from the Employment Statistics Register, 
while those in panel (b) were taken from the IAB Employer Survey. See text, section IV. 
 
 
 
 
Appendix Table 2: The Determinants of (Log) Wages, Including Interaction 
Terms between Works Councils and Selected Covariates 
 Coefficient 
(s.e.) 
Coefficient 
(s.e.) 
Works council 0.055 
(0.016) 
0.106   
(0.015) 
Works council * Collective agreement (sector 
level)  
 -0.008 
  (0.018) 
Works council * Collective agreement (estab. 
level) 
 0.113 
(0.028) 
Worker characteristics:   
Gender (female) -0.270 
(0.010) 
-0.182 
  (0.003) 
Tenure (in years) 0.014 
(0.001) 
0.014    
(0.001) 
Tenure2 -0.000 
(0.000) 
-0.0003   
(0.00001) 
Age 0.031 
(0.001) 
0.031    
(0.001) 
Age2 -0.000 
(0.000) 
-0.0003   
(0.00001) 
Seceduc2 0.028 
(0.014) 
0.057 
(0.005) 
Terteduc1 -0.171 
(0.144) 
0.03 
(0.02) 
Terteduc2 0.175 
(0.016) 
0.125    
(0.007) 
Polytechnic 0.238 
(0.017) 
0.270    
(0.008) 
University 0.372 
(0.023) 
0.411     
(0.011) 
Works council * Gender 0.098 
(0.011) 
 
Works council * Seceduc2 0.035 
(0.015) 
 
Works council * Terteduc1 0.221 
(0.145) 
 
Works council * Terteduc2 -0.051 
(0.017) 
 
Works council * Polytechnic 0.038 
(0.017) 
 
Works council * University 0.045 
(0.023) 
 
Unskilled blue collar -0.074 
(0.004) 
-0.075    
(0.005) 
Appendix Table 2 (cont.) 
Highly skilled blue collar 0.258 
(0.008) 
0.259    
(0.008) 
White collar 0.236 
(0.005) 
0.236    
(0.0048) 
 Foreigner -0.012 
(0.004) 
-0.013    
(0.004) 
Establishment characteristics:   
western Germany 0.194 
(0.008) 
0.191    
(0.008) 
size20_99 0.025 
(0.015) 
0.029    
(0.014) 
size100_249 0.037 
(0.016) 
0.042    
(0.016) 
size250_499 0.061 
(0.017) 
0.066    
(0.017) 
size500_999 0.097 
(0.017) 
0.101   
(0.017) 
Size1000 0.111 
(0.018) 
0.115    
(0.018) 
Collective agreement 
    on sector level 
  
    on establishment level 
 
 
0.052 
(0.009) 
0.057 
(0.013) 
 
0.064   
(0.014) 
-0.047    
(0.023) 
Payment above collective agreement 
 
0.025 
(0.007) 
0.026    
(0.007) 
High profits 0.021 
(0.007) 
0.021    
(0.007) 
Modern technical equipment -0.001 
(0.008) 
-0.0006    
(0.007) 
Overtime supplement 0.001 
(0.000) 
0.0008    
(0.0001) 
Export 0.005 
(0.009) 
0.005    
(0.009) 
Establishment-average worker 
characteristics: 
  
Average female -0.211 
(0.026) 
-0.225     
(0.025) 
Average age   0.000 
(0.001) 
0.0002    
(0.001) 
Average unskilled blue collar   -0.807 
(0.068) 
-0.802     
(0.069) 
Average low skilled blue collar -0.896 
(0.069) 
-0.892    
(0.070) 
Average highly skilled blue collar -0.693 
(0.111) 
-0.713    
(0.111) 
Appendix Table 2 (cont.) 
Average white collar -0.618 
(0.068) 
-0.611    
(0.069) 
Average foreigners 0.033 
(0.038) 
0.0337    
(0.038) 
Propensity score 0.002 
(0.000) 
0.002    
(0.0005) 
R2 0.63 0.63 
F 1280.86 1309.17 
N 1,248,506 1,248,506 
Number of establishments 8,131 8,131 
Notes: Omitting for simplicity the remaining explanatory variables and denoting works 
council status by the dummy Woco and gender (female) by the dummy d, the estimated 
model in column (1) is given by iiiiii dWocoWocody ωββββ ++++= *3210 , where the 
coefficient 3β  gives the wage premium earned by females in works councils 
establishments. In column (2) the model includes two dummies, one for each collective 
agreement status (sector and establishment level). The interpretation is analogous. See 
also the Notes to Table 2a. 
Appendix Table 3: Wage Dispersion Within Establishments 
Dependent variable Standard deviation of 
individual wages 
 
Coefficient of variation (i.e. 
standard deviation divided by 
the average wage) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Works council  -0.753 
(0.032) 
-0.811 
(0.042) 
-0.021 
(0.000) 
-0.017 
(0.001) 
Works council * Collective 
agreement (sector level)  
 0.126 
(0.057) 
 -0.004 
(0.001) 
Works council * Collective 
agreement (establishment level) 
 -0.001 
(0.101) 
 -0.022 
(0.001) 
Establishment characteristics:     
western Germany 9.602 
(0.023) 
9.604 
(0.023) 
0.043 
(0.000) 
0.044 
(0.000) 
size20_99 3.784 
(0.085) 
3.785 
(0.085) 
0.050 
(0.001) 
0.050 
(0.001) 
size100_249 6.025 
(0.085) 
6.025 
 (0.085)  
0.068 
(0.001) 
0.068 
(0.001) 
size250_499 6.878 
(0.085) 
6.876 
(0.085) 
0.068 
(0.001) 
0.068 
(0.001) 
size500_999 8.389 
(0.086) 
8.387 
 (0.086)  
0.072 
(0.001) 
0.071 
(0.001) 
size1000 9.222 
(0.086) 
9.218 
 (0.086)  
0.063 
(0.001) 
0.063 
(0.001) 
Collective agreement 
    at sector level 
  
    at establishment level 
 
 
-0.l13 
(0.025) 
-0.654 
(0.028) 
 
-0.206 
(0.051) 
-0.626 
(0.096) 
 
-0.012 
(0.000) 
-0.021 
(0.000) 
 
-0.010 
(0.001) 
-0.002 
(0.001) 
Payment above collective 
agreement 
 
0.460 
(0.013) 
0.460 
(0.014) 
-0.004 
(0.000) 
-0.004    
(0.000) 
High profits 0.256 
(0.011) 
0.256 
(0.011) 
-0.003 
(0.000) 
-0.003 
(0.000) 
Modern technical equipment 0.933 
(0.014) 
0.933 
(0.014) 
0.011 
(0.000) 
0.011 
(0.000) 
Overtime supplement 0.005 
(0.000) 
0.005 
(0.000) 
-0.000 
(0.000) 
-0.000   
(0.000) 
Share temporary workers 0.094 
(0.073) 
0.086 
(0.072) 
0.061 
(0.001) 
0.059 
(0.0008) 
Export 1.481 
(0.014) 
1.480 
  (0.014)  
0.019 
(0.000) 
0.019 
(0.0002) 
Appendix Table 3 (cont.) 
Establishment-average worker 
characteristics: 
    
Average female 0.484 
(0.053) 
0.485 
(0.053) 
0.122 
(0.001) 
0.122 
(0.001) 
Average age   0.061 
(0.003) 
0.061    
(0.003) 
-0.001 
(0.000) 
-0.001    
(0.000) 
Average tenure 0.000 
(0.000) 
0.001    
(0.000)  
0.000 
(0.000) 
0.000 
 (0.000) 
Average unskilled blue collar   6.358 
(0.647) 
6.358    
(0.646) 
0.262 
(0.010) 
0.263    
(0.010) 
Average low skilled blue collar 7.276 
(0.650) 
7.274    
(0.649) 
0.273 
(0.010) 
0.273    
(0.010) 
Average highly skilled blue 
collar 
22.601 
(0.703) 
22.609 
(0.702)  
0.365 
(0.011) 
0.366    
(0.0109) 
Average white collar 21.240 
(0.653) 
21.239 
(0.652) 
0.269 
(0.010) 
0.270    
(0.010) 
Average foreigners 6.282 
(0.080) 
6.285 
(0.080) 
0.050 
(0.001) 
0.050    
(0.0001) 
Average Seceduc1 -3.398 
(0.063) 
-3.395 
(0.063) 
-0.021 
(0.000) 
-0.021    
(0.0009) 
Average Seceduc2 -2.086 
(0.056) 
-2.083 
(0.056) 
-0.034 
(0.001) 
-0.034    
(0.0008) 
Average Terteduc1 6.992 
(0.442) 
6.984 
(0.442) 
0.095 
(0.008) 
0.095    
(0.008) 
Average Terteduc2 13.327 
(0.162) 
13.231 
  (0.162)
  
0.048 
(0.002) 
0.048    
(0.0017) 
Average Polytechnic 17.377 
(0.190) 
17.372 
(0.191)  
0.072 
(0.002) 
0.071    
(0.002) 
Average University 35.327 
(0.161) 
35.332 
(0.161)  
0.170 
(0.001) 
0.169    
(0.002) 
R2 0.73 0.73 0.40 0.40 
F 73763.14 70596.71 15701.93 15031.42 
N 1,277,676 1,277,676 1,277,676 1,277,676 
Appendix Table 4a: Establishments with 21-100 Employees – Descriptive 
Statistics (Individual Level) 
Variable All workers Workers in 
establishments with 
works councils 
(log) Wages 4.255 4.381 
Works council 0.457  
Fraction females 0.314 0.308 
Tenure (in years) 6.421 7.450 
Age (years) 41.05 42.201 
Distribution by skill level:   
Unskilled blue collar 0.189 0.168 
Highly skilled blue collar 0.023 0.025 
White collar 0.445 0.500 
 Foreigner 0.043 0.041 
Collective agreement 
  on sector level 
  on establishment level 
 
0.489 
0.089 
 
0.646 
0.135 
Payment above collective agreement 0.356 0.403 
Western  Germany 0.570 0.611 
High profits 0.284 0.238 
Modern technical equipment 0.708 0.670 
Overtime supplement 20.694 18.485 
Export 0.278 0.287 
Distribution by schooling level:   
Seceduc1 0.097 0.097 
Seceduc2 0.672 0.680 
Terteduc1 0.004 0.005 
Terteduc2 0.032 0.037 
Polytechnic 0.037 0.048 
University 0.055 0.075 
 
Appendix Table 4b: Establishments with 21-100 Employees – The Determinants 
of (Log) Wages, All Workers 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Works council 0.227 
(0.014) 
0.094 
(0.009) 
0.073 
(0.009) 
0.065 
(0.009) 
R2 0.07 0.56 0.57 0.57 
F 257.08 392.49 526.98 522.34 
N 96,011 95,885 95,885 95,408 
Number of establishments 2,754 2,751 2,751 2,737 
Notes: see Table 2a 
 
 
Appendix Table 4c: Establishments with 21-100 Employees – The Determinants 
of (Log) Wages by Gender  
  Men Women 
Works council 0.05 
(0.009) 
0.100 
(0.013) 
R2 0.60 0.50 
F 468.5 131.11 
N 65,756  29,652 
Number of establishments 2,671 2,607 
Notes: see Table 2a 
 
Appendix Table 4d: Establishments with 21-100 Employees – The Determinants 
of (Log) Wages by Schooling Level 
 Seceduc
1 
Seceduc2 Terteduc
1 
Terteduc
2 
Polytechni
c 
Universit
y 
Works council 0.059 
(0.016) 
0.074 
(0.010) 
-0.057 
(0.064) 
0.031 
(0.021) 
0.058 
(0.020) 
0.044 
(0.024) 
R2 0.54 0.56 0.54 0.45 0.49 0.36 
F 74.75 374.90 13.17 54.86 50.32 36.30 
N 9,204 64,268 434 3,131 3,601 5,284 
Number of 
establishments 
1,377 2,658 295 1,121 1,062 1,046 
Notes: see Table 2a 
 
Appendix Table 4e: Establishments with 21-100 Employees – Quantile (Log) 
Wage Regressions by Works Council Coverage and Gender 
Quantiles  
0.20 0.40 0.60 0.80 
Complete Sample: 
Works council 
 
 
 
0.056 
(0.002) 
 
 
0.059 
(0.002) 
 
 
0.062    
(0.002) 
 
 
0.060    
(0.003) 
Men: 
Works council 
 
 
 
0.044 
(0.003) 
 
 
0.048 
(0.002) 
 
 
0.051 
(0.003) 
 
 
0.052 
(0.003) 
 
Women: 
Works council 
 
 
 
0.107 
(0.005) 
 
 
0.095 
(0.005) 
 
 
0.093 
(0.004) 
 
 
0.083 
(0.005) 
Notes: See Table 4. 
 
Appendix Table 4f): The Determinants of Tenure (Card and de la Rica Model) 
All Men Women  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Works council 0.823   
(0.154) 
-0.409   
(1.481) 
0.783   
(0.182) 
-1.551   
(1.902) 
0.915 
(0.165) 
1.048   
(1.806) 
Predicted (log) wage*works 
council  
-- 0.292    
(0.364) 
 0.542   
(0.456) 
 -0.033   
(0.452) 
R2 0.23 0.23 0.24 0.24 0.21 0.21 
F 52.08 52.08 39.40 39.49 41.23 40.72 
N 96,524 96,524 66,307 66,607 30,217 30,217 
Number of establishments 2,751 2,751 2,684 2,684 2,623 2,623 
Notes: see Table 5. 
 
 
Appendix Table 4g): Determinants of Tenure (Freeman/Medoff  Tenure Model) 
 Coefficient (s.e.) 
(log) Wages 0.710 
(0.034) 
Works council 0.144 
(0.032) 
Sex (female) 0.286 
(0.019) 
R2 0.210 
F 142.00 
N 97,264 
Number of establishments 2,848 
Notes: see Table 6. 
